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INTRODUCTION 
The public’s interest in medicine and good health is substantial. However, 
this interest is harmed when important medical devices or pharmaceuticals, 
although infringing on valid patents, are suddenly taken off the market after a 
court grants a permanent injunction. While permanent injunctions were 
automatically granted by the Federal Circuit before the Supreme Court’s holding 
in eBay v. MercExchange, courts now have more discretion to deny injunctive 
relief. Now that courts have this newfound discretion after eBay, the public 
should no longer expect to be harmed by the sudden removal of medical 
supplies from the marketplace. Unfortunately, this has not been the course that 
all courts have taken post-eBay. To protect the public interest, courts should 
apply a rebuttable presumption in medically-related patent cases, finding that the 
public interest weighs against granting an injunction. 
This Comment highlights the necessity for this rebuttable presumption to 
help protect the public health. Part I provides a brief overview of the history of 
injunctive relief in patent infringement cases prior to 2006 and the few 
exceptions applied to deny injunctions. Part II analyzes the eBay v. 
MercExchange case, from its beginning in the district court to its remand back to 
the district court after the landmark decision in the Supreme Court. Next, Part III 
provides an overview of general trends regarding injunctive relief in patent 
infringement cases post-eBay and also analyzes the courts’ treatment of 
injunctive relief in recent cases in the medical patent space. Finally, in Part IV 
expresses the importance of the public interest in medicine and the public health 
and lays out the multiple reasons why it is necessary that the courts to apply a 
rebuttable presumption of public interest to deny injunctive relief in patent cases 
involving medically-related patents. Lastly, a set of hypothetical situations is 
offered to emphasize the necessity of the rebuttable presumption. 
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I. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF IN PATENT INFRINGEMENT CASES PRIOR TO 2006 
A.  Injunctive Relief Overview 
The United States Constitution provides Congress with the enumerated 
power “to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for 
limited times to . . . inventors the exclusive right to their respective . . . 
discoveries.”1 Pursuant to this power, the Patent Act of 1952, as amended, 
governs patent law in the United States.2 A patent grants its holder the “right to 
exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention 
throughout the United States” for a certain amount of time.3 When this right to 
exclude is infringed upon, courts “may grant injunctions in accordance with the 
principles of equity to prevent the violation of any right secured by patent, on 
such terms as the court deems reasonable.”4 Courts have traditionally established 
that a plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction must satisfy a four-factor test 
before being granted such relief.5 These factors include: 
(1) that [the plaintiff] has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies 
available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate 
for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the 
plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the 
public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.6 
However, not all courts have followed this four-factor test. 
B. Federal Circuit’s “General Rule” 
The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals, established in 1982 and given 
exclusive patent appellate jurisdiction,7 did not follow this traditional four-factor 
test prior to 2006.8 Instead, the Federal Circuit followed a “general rule that an 
injunction will issue when infringement has been adjudged, absent a sound 
reason for denying it.”9 This “automatic injunction rule,” or “general rule,” arose 
  
 1 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 2 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006); see Sue Ann Mota, eBay v. MercExchange: Traditional 
Four-Factor Test for Injunctive Relief Applies to Patent Cases, According to the Supreme 
Court, 40 AKRON L. REV. 529, 530–33 (2007) (for a brief overview of patent law). 
 3 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2006). Currently, the term of a utility patent is twenty years 
from the date that the patent application is filed. Id. § 154(a)(2). 
 4 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2006). 
 5 eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006). 
 6 Id. 
 7 Robin M. Davis, Failed Attempts to Dwarf the Patent Trolls: Permanent 
Injunctions in Patent Infringement Cases Under the Proposed Patent Reform Act of 2005 
and eBay v. MercExchange, 17 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 431, 435 (2008). 
 8 eBay, 547 U.S. at 391–94. 
 9 Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1247 (Fed. Cir. 1989). 
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because the Federal Circuit would automatically apply a presumption of 
irreparable harm to patentees upon a finding of infringement.10 This presumption 
of irreparable harm was justified based upon the right to exclude granted by 
patents.11 Thus, successful plaintiffs were granted injunctions as a matter of 
course for over three decades.12 
C. Public Health Exception 
While most successful patentees received permanent injunctions under 
the general rule, there was an exception to this rule.13 Prior to 2006, courts 
would deny an injunction “in order to protect the public interest.”14 For example, 
in City of Milwaukee v. Activated Sludge, Inc., the Seventh Circuit denied 
permanent injunctive relief to protect the public health.15 While the defendant 
had infringed on the plaintiff’s patented sewage treatment process, the court 
found that enforcing a permanent injunction would have closed the only sewage 
plant in the entire community.16 An injunction would have left the community 
without means to dispose of raw sewage other than running it into Lake 
Michigan and polluting the waters.17 Furthermore, such an order would have 
posed environmental and health risks to over half a million residents.18 The court 
concluded that: 
It is suggested that such harmful effect could be counteracted by chemical 
treatment of the sewage, but where, as here, the health and the lives of 
more than half a million people are involved, we think no risk should be 
taken, and we feel impelled to deny appellee’s contention in this respect.19 
Courts have also used the public interest exception to protect the public 
health when certain medically-related patents were involved.20 For example, in 
Vitamin Technologists v. Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation, the defendant 
had infringed a patented process that produced vitamin D.21 This process 
  
 10 Davis, supra note 7, at 435–36. 
 11 See MercExchange, LLC v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2005), 
vacated sub nom. eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
 12 Davis, supra note 7, at 436. 
 13 Id. 
 14 Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1547–48 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
 15 69 F.2d 577, 593 (7th Cir. 1934). 
 16 Id. 
 17 Id. 
 18 Id. 
 19 Id. 
 20 See Hybritech Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (C.D. Cal. 1987), 
aff’d, 849 F.2d 1446 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Datascope Corp. v. Kontron, Inc., 611 F. Supp. 
889 (D. Mass. 1985), aff’d, 786 F.2d 398 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Vitamin Technologists v. Wis. 
Alumni Research Found., 146 F.2d 941 (9th Cir. 1944). 
 21 Vitamin Technologists, 146 F.2d at 942. 
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contributed to the cure or amelioration of the disease, rickets.22 Even though 
these patents were found to be invalid, leaving the patentee without remedy, the 
court noted the public health implications of an injunction in dicta.23 While the 
patented process at issue could have been used to help cure rickets, a disease 
affecting the poor, the patentee withheld the practice of the patented process for 
this purpose.24 The court noted “it is a public offense to withhold such processes 
from any of the principal foods of the rachitic poor”25 and concluded that such 
refusal warranted the denial of a permanent injunction.26 
Further, in Datascope Corp. v. Kontron, Inc., the plaintiff alleged that the 
defendant had infringed its patented dual lumen heart catheter (IAB)27 and 
sought preliminary injunctive relief.28 Although preliminary injunctions and 
permanent injunctions differ in scope, the same traditional four factors are 
analyzed.29 The defendant made a showing that it would be irreparably harmed 
by a preliminary injunction because it would suffer losses in sales, be forced to 
lay off employees, its good will would be injured, and it would have to write off 
inventory and capital improvements.30 More importantly, the defendant made a 
showing that the public interest would be harmed by a preliminary injunction 
because the record showed that “some physicians prefer defendant’s dual lumen 
IABs.”31 Ultimately, the court denied the plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief 
with respect to the defendant’s dual lumen IABs.32 
Additionally, some courts have modified permanent injunctions in 
medically-related patent infringement cases to allow for transition periods to 
accommodate the public interest.33 In Shiley, Inc. v. Bentley Labs., Inc., 
injunctive relief was granted against the defendant for the plaintiff’s patented 
  
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. at 944–47. 
 24 Id. at 944. 
 25 Id. at 945. 
 26 Id. at 956. 
 27 Datascope Corp. v. Kontron, Inc., 611 F. Supp. 889, 894 (D. Mass. 1985), aff’d, 
786 F.2d 398 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
 28 Id. at 891. 
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. at 894. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Id.; see Hybritech Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1015 (C.D. Cal. 
1987), aff’d, 849 F.2d 1446 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (denying preliminary injunction for 
infringed cancer and hepatitis test kits due to public health interests); see also Cordis 
Corp. v. Boston Scientific Corp., No. CIV.A.03-027-SLR, 2003 WL 22843072, at *2 (D. 
Del. Nov. 21, 2003), aff’d, 99 F. App’x 928 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (denying preliminary 
injunction for infringed drug-eluting stents due to public health risks posed by inadequate 
supply). 
 33 See Schneider (Europe) AG v. SciMed Life Sys., Inc., 852 F. Supp. 813 (D. Minn. 
1994); Shiley, Inc. v. Bentley Labs., Inc., 601 F. Supp. 964 (C.D. Cal. 1985). 
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bubble blood oxygenator.34 However, due to concerns of potential short-term 
supply problems from the sudden impact of the injunction, the court ordered that 
the injunction “contain a six-month transition period to allow an efficient and 
non-disruptive changeover for those institutions who now employ the 
[infringing device] exclusively.”35 
While the public interest exception was used to deny some medically-
related patent injunctions, most injunctions were still granted.36 The Federal 
Circuit’s “general rule” was abrogated, however, upon the Supreme Court’s 
holding in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange.37 
II. EBAY INC. V. MERCEXCHANGE, L.L.C. 
A. The District Court 
On May 27, 2003, following a five-week trial, a jury sitting in the District 
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia returned a verdict finding that the 
defendants, eBay Inc. and Half.com (a subsidiary of eBay Inc.), had infringed on 
valid patents covering methods for conducting online auctions belonging to the 
plaintiff, MercExchange, L.L.C.38 Following the jury trial, MercExchange filed a 
motion for entry of a permanent injunction order.39 The court’s analysis began 
by summarizing the precedent set by the Federal Circuit’s general rule, 
automatically granting permanent injunctions after a finding of validity and 
infringement, but it also reviewed the traditional four factors.40 
  
 34 Shiley, 601 F. Supp. at 971. 
 35 Id.; see Schneider, 852 F. Supp. at 861–62 (employing a six-month transition 
period within permanent injunction of infringing medical catheter devices to “allow an 
efficient and non-disruptive changeover for those institutions and physicians who now 
employ the [infringing device] exclusively”). 
 36 See Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 867 (Fed. Cir. 1984) 
(reversing denial of injunctive relief upon finding of infringement and remanding for 
injunctive relief grant); Biacore v. Thermo Bioanalysis Corp., 79 F. Supp. 2d 422, 473–
74 (D. Del. 1999) (finding no sound reason to deny permanent injunctive relief for 
infringed matrix coating suitable for use in a biosensor); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, 7 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1439, 1445 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (granting a permanent injunction while 
holding that, although there is a public interest in the marketing of life saving medical 
devices, such as the defendant’s infringing heart defibrillator, this interest is outweighed 
by the greater public interest in “granting injunctions to effectuate patent rights”). 
 37 See eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006). 
 38 MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 275 F. Supp. 2d 695, 698–99 (E.D. Va. 2003), 
aff’d in part, rev’d in part 401 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005), vacated sub nom. eBay, Inc. v. 
MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. at 711. 
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The court then analyzed each equitable factor, beginning with irreparable 
harm.41 The plaintiff argued for the presumption of irreparable harm established 
by precedent and argued that it would be “deprived of its ability to either pursue 
the development of its inventions under the protection of its patent rights, or to 
have the exclusive right to license its patented technology to others on the most 
beneficial terms available” if an injunction did not issue.42 However, the 
defendant argued that the presumption of irreparable harm was rebuttable and 
attempted to refute the presumption by highlighting certain behaviors of the 
plaintiff43 including the plaintiff’s failure to practice the patent and an expressed 
willingness to license the patent to the defendant. The court found that the 
factors weighed against an injunction because the plaintiff would not be 
irreparably harmed if a permanent injunction did not issue.44 Under the factor 
pertaining to an adequate remedy at law, the court found that this factor weighed 
against an injunction due to the plaintiff’s previous licensing of the patent to 
others and their expressed willingness to license the patent to eBay.45 Under the 
public interest factor, the court found that, while there was a public interest in 
enforcing valid patents, there was also a public interest in “using a patented 
business-method that the patent holder declines to practice.”46 Therefore, the 
court concluded that this factor equally supported both granting and denying an 
injunction.47 Finally, under the balance of hardships factor, the court found that 
this factor tipped slightly in the defendant’s favor because the plaintiff could be 
adequately compensated monetarily and granting an injunction would open “a 
Pandora’s box of new problems” for both parties.48 Ultimately, the court denied 
the plaintiff’s motion for entry of a permanent injunction order,49 and the case 
was appealed to the Federal Circuit.50 
B. The Federal Circuit 
The Federal Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of a permanent 
injunction under an abuse of discretion standard.51 The court opined that the 
public interest of using a business-method patent that the patent holder declines 
to practice is not “the type of important public need that justifies the unusual 
  
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. at 712–13. 
 46 Id. at 712–14. 
 47 Id. at 714. 
 48 Id. at 714–15. 
 49 Id. at 715. 
 50 MercExchange, LLC v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2005), vacated 
sub nom. eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
 51 Id. at 1338. 
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step of denying injunctive relief.”52 Furthermore, the district court’s fear that an 
injunction would open both parties to new problems was viewed to be an 
inadequate reason for denying injunctive relief.53 Moreover, the fact that 
MercExchange was willing to license the patent was an inadequate reason for 
denying injunctive relief. The court reasoned that although an “injunction gives 
the patentee additional leverage in licensing, that is a natural consequence of the 
right to exclude and not an inappropriate reward to a party that does not intend 
to compete in the marketplace with potential infringers.”54 The Federal Circuit, 
seeing “no reason to depart from the general rule that courts will issue 
permanent injunctions against patent infringement absent exceptional 
circumstances,” granted the injunction.55 The Supreme Court granted certiorari 
on November 28, 2005.56 
C. The Supreme Court 
The majority opinion for eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., written by 
Justice Thomas, was rather short and solely dealt with determining the 
appropriateness of the Federal Circuit’s general rule regarding permanent 
injunctions.57 The Court abrogated the general rule and mandated that, 
“[a]ccording to well-established principles of equity, a plaintiff seeking a 
permanent injunction must satisfy a four-factor test before a court may grant 
such relief.”58 The Court established that a plaintiff must demonstrate: 
(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at 
law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that 
injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff 
and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public 
interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.59 
The Court stressed that “the creation of a right is distinct from the provision of 
remedies for violations of that right.”60 Analyzing the district court’s suggestion 
that injunctive relief could not issue “in a broad swath of cases,” especially 
where a plaintiff is willing to license the patent or does not commercially 
practice the patent, the Court held that “traditional equitable principles do not 
permit such broad classifications.”61 The Court then determined that the Federal 
  
 52 Id. at 1339. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. 
 56 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 546 U.S. 1029 (2005). 
 57 See eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 389 (2006). 
 58 Id. at 391. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. at 392. 
 61 Id. at 393. 
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Circuit’s general rule created a categorical grant of injunctive relief in 
opposition to the traditional rules of equity.62 The majority opinion ultimately 
vacated the judgment of the Federal Circuit and remanded for further 
proceedings.63 
Chief Justice Roberts wrote a concurring opinion that was joined by 
Justice Scalia and Justice Ginsburg.64 While Chief Justice Roberts agreed with 
the majority opinion’s holding that the decision to grant injunctive relief must 
“be exercised consistent with traditional principles of equity,” he highlighted the 
historical treatment of injunctive relief in patent infringement cases, noting that 
injunctive relief was granted in a vast majority of cases since the early 
nineteenth century.65 The Roberts concurrence did reject the Federal Circuit 
general rule but also noted that district courts should let history play a role in 
determining whether injunctive relief should be issued rather than “writing on an 
entirely clean slate.”66 He concluded by noting that “[w]hen it comes to 
discerning and applying those standards, in this area as others, ‘a page of history 
is worth a volume of logic.’”67 The Roberts concurrence arguably emphasized 
that permanent injunctions should still be liberally granted.68 
Justice Kennedy also wrote a concurring opinion that was joined by 
Justice Stevens, Justice Souter, and Justice Breyer.69 While Justice Kennedy 
concurs with the majority opinion’s holding and acknowledges Chief Justice 
Robert’s emphasis on historical precedent, he pointed out three ways that the 
patent industry has changed since the historical decisions were decided.70 First, 
the Kennedy concurrence highlighted the increased use of patent holders that 
“use patents not as a basis for producing and selling goods but, instead, 
primarily for obtaining licensing fees.”71 Justice Kennedy noted that injunctive 
relief might not be a good remedy as these firms usually use their patents to 
charge exorbitant licensing fees.72 Next, the opinion acknowledged that legal 
remedies may suffice and denial of an injunction may be in the public interest 
when the patent covers only a small component of a much larger commercial 
product and “the threat of an injunction is employed simply for undue leverage 
in negotiations.”73 Finally, the opinion concluded by analyzing the difference in 
  
 62 Id. at 394. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
 65 Id. at 395. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. (quoting New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921)). 
 68 George M. Newcombe et al., Prospective Relief for Patent Infringement in a Post-
eBay World, 4 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 549, 555 (2008). 
 69 eBay, 547 U.S. at 395 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 70 Id. at 395–97. 
 71 Id. at 396. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. at 396–97. 
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the nature of contemporary patents compared to historical patents.74 Justice 
Kennedy stated that “injunctive relief may have different consequences for the 
burgeoning number of patents over business methods, which were not of much 
economic and legal significance in earlier times. The potential vagueness and 
suspect validity of some of these patents may affect the calculus under the four-
factor test.”75 
D. The District Court Remand 
On remand, the district court reanalyzed the four-factor test for injunctive 
relief pursuant to the preceding Supreme Court opinion.76 It is relevant to note 
that subsequent to the jury verdict, MercExchange non-exclusively licensed its 
patent portfolio to uBid, a direct competitor of eBay.77 Additionally, 
MercExchange and uBid had begun preliminary negotiations about exclusive 
licensing shortly after the Supreme Court’s eBay opinion but were unable to 
reach an agreement successfully.78 Before its analysis under the four-factor test, 
the court determined whether a presumption of irreparable harm upon a finding 
of validity and infringement still applied after the Supreme Court opinion.79 
After reviewing relevant post-eBay cases, the court determined that a 
presumption of irreparable harm no longer existed, but rather, the burden was on 
the plaintiff to prove irreparable harm.80 However, the court was “not blind to 
the reality that the nature of the right protected by a patent, the right to exclude, 
will frequently result in a plaintiff successfully establishing irreparable harm in 
the wake of establishing validity and infringement.”81 
The court then applied the four-factor test to the facts of the case, 
beginning with the irreparable harm factor.82 Determining that the plaintiff did 
not establish irreparable harm, the court concluded that this factor weighed 
against the entry of an injunction.83 Based on multiple factors, the court reached 
  
 74 Id. at 397. 
 75 Id. 
 76 MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d 556, 568 (E.D. Va. 2007). 
 77 Id. at 561. 
 78 Id. at 562. 
 79 Id. at 568–69. 
 80 Id.; see z4 Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 437, 440 (E.D. Tex. 
2006) (concluding that the language in the Supreme Court’s eBay opinion “does not 
imply a presumption, but places the burden of proving irreparable injury on the 
plaintiff”); Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., No. 2:04–CV–211–DF, 2006 WL 
2385139, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Aug.16, 2006), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 504 F.3d 1293 
(Fed. Cir. 2007) (“The eBay decision demonstrates that no presumption of irreparable 
harm should automatically follow from a finding of infringement.”). 
 81 MercExchange, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 569. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. 
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this conclusion by determining that “MercExchange ha[d] acted inconsistently 
with defending its right to exclude and that it ha[d] failed to establish why its 
harm [wa]s irreparable.”84 First, the court noted MercExchange’s lack of 
commercial activity in practicing the relevant patents.85 The court prudentially 
acknowledged that this factor, while not being dispositive against granting an 
injunction, was “one factor that this court must consider in weighing the 
equities.”86 Next, the court recognized MercExchange’s private and public 
actions indicating its desire to obtain royalties from eBay.87 The relevant public 
actions included MercExchange’s and its attorney’s multiple public expressions 
regarding MercExchange’s willingness to license its patents to eBay.88 The 
relevant private action included pre-trial licensing negotiations between 
MercExchange and eBay.89 Additionally, the court acknowledged 
MercExchange’s failure to motion for preliminary injunction.90 Like the non-
commercial activity factor, the court recognized that this factor was also not 
dispositive against granting an injunction and likened the failure to motion for 
preliminary injunction to MercExchange’s desire to obtain reasonable royalties 
from eBay.91 Finally, the court raised the same concern in its previous analysis 
regarding the nature of the relevant patents—the business method patent and “a 
patent which appears to rely upon a unique combination of non-unique elements 
present in prior art.”92 Additionally, the court was not persuaded by 
MercExchange’s argument that irreparable harm was proved because eBay was 
a market monopolist.93 To comply with the ruling in the Supreme Court’s eBay 
opinion, the court emphasized that its determination was specific to the facts in 
this case and “not broad classifications or categorical exclusions of certain types 
of patent holders.”94 
Next, the court analyzed the adequate remedy at law factor, concluding 
that “damages at law constitute[d] an adequate remedy for eBay’s wilful 
infringement.”95 The court recognized that the analysis for this factor greatly 
overlapped the analysis for the first factor.96 The fact that MercExchange did not 
commercially utilize its patent, its willingness to license to eBay, and its 
  
 84 Id. at 569–76. 
 85 Id. at 570. 
 86 Id. at 570. 
 87 Id. at 572–73. 
 88 Id. at 572. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. at 573. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. at 574–76. 
 93 Id. at 579–80. 
 94 Id. at 570. 
 95 Id. at 582. 
 96 Id. 
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licensing activity with others in the industry convinced the court that money 
damages through a royalty paid by eBay would suffice.97 
Then, the court analyzed the third factor—the balance of hardships.98 
Based upon the uncertainty of MercExchange’s negotiations with uBid, 
uncertainty involving eBay’s ability to design around the relevant patents, and 
uncertainty of the patents’ ability to survive reexamination.99 If eBay could have 
designed around the patent, the court concluded that eBay would not have 
suffered hardship if an injunction were granted.100 On the other hand, the court 
concluded that MercExchange would not suffer hardship if an injunction was 
denied due to royalties received from eBay or, in the alternative, did not suffer 
hardship due to the failed negotiations with uBid.101 
Finally, the court analyzed the fourth factor—the public interest.102 
Considering “the type of patent involved, the impact on the market, the impact 
on the patent system, and any other factor that may impact the public at large,” 
the court concluded that the public interest factor weighed slightly in favor 
against granting an injunction.103 Under the first factor, the type of patent 
involved, the court acknowledged Justice Kennedy’s words of caution in his 
eBay concurrence.104 Next, although the public health was not implicated in this 
case and there is an interest in a strong patent system that protects patentees 
from infringers, the court still felt that damages at law were in the best interest 
of the public due to the difference in market size between eBay and 
MercExchange and MercExchange’s intentions to neither defend its right to 
exclude or prevent development of its patent by others.105 Again, the court 
emphasized that its analysis was based upon the specific facts of the case and 
did not create a general rule.106 Then, concluding that neither allegation was 
given any weight to its analysis, the court reviewed the allegations by each party 
of inequitable conduct by the opposing party.107 The court analyzed eBay’s 
status as a wilful infringer in its public interest analysis and concluded that while 
it was significant, it was insufficient to tip the analysis in MercExchange’s 
  
 97 Id. at 582–83. 
 98 Id. at 583–86. 
 99 Id. at 583–84. 
 100 Id. at 584. 
 101 Id. at 584–85. 
 102 Id. at 586. 
 103 Id. 
 104 Id.; see eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 397 (2006) (Kennedy, 
J., concurring) (noting that the “potential vagueness and suspect validity of some 
[business method patents] may affect the calculus under the four-factor test”). 
 105 MercExchange, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 586–88. 
 106 Id. at 588. 
 107 Id. at 588–90. 
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favor.108 Ultimately, the court found the four-factor test in eBay’s favor and 
denied MercExchange’s motion for permanent injunction.109 
III. THE STATE OF INJUNCTIVE RELIEF IN MEDICALLY-RELATED 
PATENT CASES SINCE EBAY 
A. General Trends of Injunctive Relief Since eBay 
After the Supreme Court handed down the eBay v. MercExchange 
opinion, courts applied the four factors differently, but the results highlighted 
some general trends regarding when injunctive relief would or would not be 
granted.110 Commentators have performed informative studies that validate these 
general trends.111 First, a study by Benjamin Petersen analyzed patent cases 
granting or denying injunctive relief after the eBay decision up to February 3, 
2008, finding that injunctive relief was granted in twenty-four cases and denied 
in ten cases.112 Additionally, a study by Douglas Ellis, John Jarosz, Michael 
Chapman, and L. Scott Oliver concluded that, out of thirty-six post-eBay patent 
cases that analyzed motions for injunctive relief, such relief was granted four out 
of five times.113 Finally, a study by Rachel M. Janutis found that injunctive relief 
continued to be granted in most patent cases from February 2008 to October 
2009.114 
1. Direct Competition 
One general trend these studies observed involved direct competition 
between the parties.115 Courts were more likely to grant injunctive relief when 
the parties were direct competitors in the same marketplace.116 The Petersen 
study found that when direct competitors were involved, a denial of injunctive 
relief occurred only twice.117 Additionally, the Ellis study found that in all but 
  
 108 Id. 
 109 Id. at 590–91 (providing a good summary of the court’s application of the four-
factor test in the first instance). 
 110 Benjamin Petersen, Injunctive Relief in the Post-eBay World, 23 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 193, 197 (2008). 
 111 See id. at 196–205; see also Rachel M. Janutis, The Supreme Court’s 
Unremarkable Decision in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. 
REV. 597, 604–07 (2010); Douglas Ellis et. al, The Economic Implications (and 
Uncertainties) of Obtaining Permanent Injunctive Relief After eBay v. MercExchange, 17 
FED. CIRCUIT B.J. 437, 441–64 (2008). 
 112 Petersen, supra note 110, at 196. 
 113 Ellis et al., supra note 111, at 441–42 (analyzing cases from mid-2006 to 2008). 
 114 Janutis, supra note 111, at 605. 
 115 See Petersen, supra note 110, at 198. 
 116 Id. 
 117 Id. at 199. 
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two cases, “permanent injunctions issued in all twenty-six cases where courts 
found direct competition.”118 Finally, in the Janutis study, it was determined that 
injunctive relief was granted in seventeen cases where direct competition was 
found, while only denied in four cases.119 
The Petersen study did highlight a case, Commonwealth Scientific & 
Industrial Research Org. v. Buffalo Technology, Inc., where the district court for 
the Eastern District of Texas granted the patent holder injunctive relief despite 
the parties’ lack of direct competition.120 The court pointed out the unique aspect 
of the patent holder being a governmental research agency.121 
2. Licensing the Invention 
Another general trend was found regarding the patent holder’s licensing 
of the patent.122 These studies found that courts were less likely to grant 
injunctive relief when the patent holder licenses his invention to other parties.123 
The Petersen study found that “[i]n five of the ten post-eBay cases denying 
permanent injunctions, the patent holder licensed his invention to other parties,” 
and the existence of a licensing program was nearly dispositive in courts’ 
decisions precluding injunctive relief.124 
3. A Small Component of the Infringing Product 
A third general trend was found when the patented product is but a small 
component of a larger infringing device.125 This trend, indicating that injunctive 
relief is not generally granted in such cases, appears to follow from Justice 
Kennedy’s concurring opinion in eBay, suggesting that injunctions might not be 
appropriate in cases where the patented device is merely a small component of 
the infringing device because “legal damages may well be sufficient to 
compensate for the infringement and an injunction may not serve the public 
interest.”126 The Petersen study indicated that injunctive relief was never granted 
when the patented device was merely a small component.127 
  
 118 Ellis et al., supra note 111, at 442. 
 119 Janutis, supra note 111, at 605–06. 
 120 Petersen, supra note 110, at 198–99; see Commonwealth Scientific & Indus. 
Research Org. v. Buffalo Tech., Inc., 492 F. Supp. 2d 600, 601 (E.D. Tex. 2007). 
 121 Commonwealth Scientific, 492 F. Supp. 2d at 603–04. 
 122 Petersen, supra note 110, at 199–200. 
 123 Id.; see Ellis et al., supra note 111, at 459–61. 
 124 Petersen, supra note 110, at 199–201. 
 125 Id. at 201–03. 
 126 Id. at 201–02; see eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 396–97 
(2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 127 Petersen, supra note 110, at 202. 
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4. Practicing the Invention 
Finally, a general trend surrounding the patent holder’s practice of the 
invention has been observed.128 Courts are more likely to grant injunctive relief 
when the patent holder practices the invention; however, there is a strong 
correlation between this trend and the direct competition trend.129 The Petersen 
study acknowledged a case, Novozymes A/S v. Genencor International, Inc., 
where, although the court granted injunctive relief despite the fact that the patent 
holder did not practice the invention, the patent holder had licensed the patent to 
one of its subsidiaries.130 The Petersen study also pointed out that this factor was 
secondary to the direct competition factor, finding the direct competition factor 
dispositive where the two factors “yield different results.”131 
B. Injunctive Relief in Medically-Related Patent Cases After eBay 
While general trends surrounding the courts’ treatment of injunctive relief 
have arisen, these trends are less apparent with regard to patent cases related to 
medicine. This section analyzes the courts’ unpredictable treatment of injunctive 
relief in medically-related patent cases—patent cases that cover device, method, 
and pharmaceutical patents related to the treatment, management, or diagnostics 
of medical illnesses. 
Since eBay v. MercExchange, district courts and the Federal Circuit have 
both granted and denied injunctive relief when medical patent infringement is 
found.132 These courts have reached these holdings based on different arbitrary 
conclusions under the traditional four-factor test.133 There have been many 
arguments by petitioners and respondents alike that highlight the importance of 
these cases.134 
1. Cases Granting Injunctive Relief 
a. Smith & Nephew, Inc. v. Synthes (U.S.A.) 
A couple of months after the eBay decision, the District Court for the 
Western District of Tennessee decided a motion for permanent injunction in a 
medical device case.135 The court found Synthes, a medical device manufacturer, 
to have infringed a collection of patents belonging to Smith & Nephew, Inc., a 
  
 128 See id. at 203–04; see also Ellis et al., supra note 111, at 451–53. 
 129 Peterson, supra note 110, at 203. 
 130 Id. at 204. 
 131 Id. 
 132 See infra Part IV.B.1–2. 
 133 Id. 
 134 Id. 
 135 Smith & Nephew, Inc. v. Synthes (U.S.A.), 466 F. Supp. 2d 978, 981 (W.D. Tenn. 
2006). 
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competitor.136 The patents related to bone nails and the methods used in the 
treatment of bone fractures.137 The court was tasked with determining whether 
Smith & Nephew was entitled to injunctive relief based on the traditional four-
factor test. Both parties made the following arguments: 
Synthes argues principally that (i) Smith & Nephew will not be irreparably 
harmed because of the limited competition between the primary Smith & 
Nephew product covered by the . . . patents and the infringing . . . nails, 
(ii) Smith & Nephew has shown a willingness to be compensated fully for 
its patents by money damages because in the past it has licensed the 
patents to its competitors and has extended several licensing offers to 
Synthes while this case has been pending, (iii) the overall balance of 
hardships favors Synthes because Smith & Nephew’s business will not be 
significantly affected by continued sales of the infringing products, and 
(iv) the public health interest in having Synthes’ allegedly safer and more 
effective TFN product available to treat femoral fractures is 
substantial. . . . Smith & Nephew argues that (i) irreparable harm to the 
sales of its patented femoral nails has been shown, together with the loss 
of market momentum and the ability to form customer relationships, (ii) 
money damages would not be adequate compensation, and (iii) the public 
health interest would not be adversely affected by a permanent injunction 
because substitute products and methods of treatment are available to the 
public through Plaintiff and its selected licensees. Smith & Nephew argues 
that it is substantially smaller than Synthes in the field of manufacturing 
trauma products, and, therefore, that an injunction would give Smith & 
Nephew the competitive support it needs to expand its customer base, 
increasing market competition.138 
Ultimately, the court granted the permanent injunction139 finding that 
irreparable harm had been established due to Smith & Nephew’s loss of market 
share, and resulting lost profits and loss of brand name recognition that were 
both incalculable and irreparable.140 Additionally, the court found that remedies 
available at law were inadequate and the balance of the hardships tipped in favor 
of Smith & Nephew due to the continuing threat of patent infringement.141 
Under the balance of the hardships analysis, the court held that the “[m]ere 
hardship incurred in the process of ceasing operations . . . is not sufficient,” and 
there were no considerable hardships imposed on physicians or patients due to 
the ability of other competing product to fill any “temporary void created by the 
injunction.”142 Finally, analyzing the public interests, the court gave great weight 
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 137 Id. 
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to the public interest in protecting the rights of patentees and did not find that 
the public would be harmed by any “minor disruption to the distribution of the 
infringing products.”143 
b. Fresenius Medical Care Holdings, Inc. v. Baxter International, Inc. 
Baxter and Fresenius, both competitors in the hemodialysis device 
market, went before the District Court for the Northern District of California in a 
patent infringement suit.144 On a motion for judgment as a matter of law, the 
court concluded that Fresenius had infringed Baxter’s patents related to a 
hemodialysis machine, commonly used for kidney disease treatment.145 Baxter 
then moved for permanent injunctive relief.146 
The court analyzed the arguments set forth by both parties under the 
traditional four-step test.147 The court found that the irreparable harm factor 
weighed in Baxter’s favor due to the direct competitiveness between both 
parties.148 Additionally, when analyzing the inadequacy of monetary damages, 
the court held that “the loss of goodwill, reputation for innovation, [and] the 
legal right to exclude, . . . are all forms of irreparable injury that cannot be easily 
and readily quantified through a simple monetary award.”149 Moreover, due to 
the evidence that Fresenius had offered at trial related to the “numerous, easily-
implemented alternatives” available, the court found that the balance of the 
hardships tipped in Baxter’s favor.150 The court held that the balance of the 
hardships favors the patentee when the infringer can sell non-infringing items.151 
The court began its public interest analysis by noting many other courts that 
have granted permanent injunctions in cases where alternative products were 
available to the infringer.152 Finally, the court found that Fresenius’ concerns—
the annual demand for dialysis machines, the lack of proof that other suppliers 
could meet the demand, the alleged inability to market the infringed product, 
and the fact that other competing products did not have the same features as the 
infringed product—could be addressed by Fresenius’ ability to design around 
the infringing product and allowing a nine-month transition period to do so.153 
  
 143 Id. at 985. 
 144 Fresenius Med. Care Holdings, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., No. C 03-1431 SBA, 2008 
WL 928496, at *1–2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 4, 2008) aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. 
Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 582 F.3d 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 145 Id. at *2. 
 146 Id. at *1–2. 
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On appeal, Fresenius argued that the district court abused its discretion by 
ignoring evidence introduced at trial.154 However, the Federal Circuit disagreed 
finding that the district court had not abused its discretion because it had fully 
analyzed each factor in the traditional four-factor test.155 The Federal Circuit did, 
however, remand the case back to the district court to reconsider the injunction 
in light of its reversal of the district court’s grant of judgment as a matter of 
law.156 
c. B. Braun Melsungen AG v. Terumo Medical Corp. 
After a 2010 jury trial, Terumo, a medical device manufacturer, was 
found to have infringed patents belonging to Braun, a competitor.157 The patents 
covered intravenous catheters used for the delivery of fluids under the skin.158 
After trial, Braun motioned for a broad permanent injunction that would have 
the effect of stopping all continuous sales of Terumo’s infringing product.159 In 
response, Terumo argued for a narrower injunction that allowed for a “sunset” 
period of fifteen months to continue selling in the alternative care market 
(approximately 30% of the total market).160 The District Court for the District of 
Delaware analyzed both proposals under the traditional four-factor test and 
granted the narrower injunction proposed by Terumo.161 The court noted Braun’s 
arguments for a broad injunction under the irreparable harm factor, including its 
lack of licensing the patents to any competitors and the endangerment of its right 
to exclude and good reputation without injunctive relief, but the court held that 
this factor weighed in favor of Terumo’s narrower injunction because it would 
not create any additional irreparable harm for Braun.162 Under the balance of the 
hardships analysis, the court held that this factor weighed in favor of Terumo’s 
proposed injunction because of the hardship that would be imposed on medical 
professionals and the endangerment to Terumo’s reputation under Braun’s broad 
injunction.163 Finally, under the public interest factor, the court held that this 
factor also weighed in favor of Terumo’s proposed injunction.164 The primary 
reasons for this holding included the effect on medical professionals under 
  
 154 Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 582 F.3d 1288, 1302–03 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
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Braun’s proposed injunction and “the public interest in access to competing 
alternatives to safe medical devices.”165 
d. Pozen Inc. v. Par Pharmaceutical, Inc. 
After a five-day bench trial, the District Court for the Eastern District of 
Texas concluded that Pozen, a pharmaceutical company, had infringed patents 
held by its direct competitor, Par Pharmaceutical.166 The patents at issue related 
to pharmaceutical formulations and methods for the treatment of migraine 
headaches.167 Par motioned for permanent injunctive relief at the conclusion of 
the bench trial, and the district court granted the injunction after a thorough 
analysis under the traditional four-factor test.168 Pozen proved that it would 
suffer irreparable harm without an injunction by producing evidence and arguing 
that a lack of injunctive relief would result in a loss of “vital revenue,” an 
irreversible loss of market share, and price erosion.169 Pozen also conclusively 
proved that monetary relief was an inadequate remedy.170 Further, the court 
found that the balance of hardships tipped in Pozen’s favor.171 Finally, under the 
public interest analysis, the court held that the public interest weighed in favor 
of a permanent injunction because of the public’s interest in encouraging 
innovation by upholding the patent holder’s right to exclude.172 Additionally, the 
court held that the public would not be harmed by a permanent injunction 
because of a large and readily-available supply of the patented product.173 
  
 165 Id. 
 166 Pozen Inc. v. Par Pharm., Inc., 800 F. Supp. 2d 789, 805–06 (E.D. Tex. 2011). 
 167 Id. at 796–97. 
 168 Id. at 825. 
 169 Id. at 824. 
 170 Id. at 824–25. 
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infringed anti-seizure medication); Research Found. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Mylan 
Pharm. Inc., No. 09-184-LPS, 2012 WL 1901267, at *3 (D. Del. May 25, 2012) (granting 
a permanent injunction of infringing pharmaceutical used to treat acne); Retractable 
Techs., Inc. v. Occupational & Med. Innovations, LTD., No. 6:08 CV 120, 2010 WL 
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2. Cases Denying Injunctive Relief 
a. Voda v. Cordis Corp. 
Voda v. Cordis Corp. involved patents related to angioplasty guide 
catheters.174 The plaintiff, Dr. Jan Voda, successfully established at trial that the 
defendant, Cordis, had willfully infringed Dr. Voda’s patents.175 The District 
Court for the Western District of Oklahoma determined whether Dr. Voda was 
entitled to injunctive relief under the four-factor test, and, using the factors 
enunciated in the eBay case, the court decided that Dr. Voda was not entitled to 
injunctive relief and denied the motion.176 The court made this determination 
based on Dr. Voda’s failure to establish that he would be irreparably harmed 
without injunctive relief and that monetary damages were inadequate.177 Dr. 
Voda did, however, argue that irreparable harm could be established by a non-
party, but the court held that such harm was irrelevant in its analysis.178 While 
Dr. Voda attempted to argue for a presumption of irreparable harm, the court 
noted that no such presumption exists after the eBay decision.179 The court did 
not analyze the balance of the hardships or the public interests involved. 
On appeal, Dr. Voda argued that the district court erred in “adopting a 
categorical rule that precludes a patent owner from proving its entitlement to an 
injunction by showing irreparable harm to its exclusive licensee.”180 The Federal 
Circuit, however, concluded that such ruling by the district court did not conflict 
with eBay and that the district court had not erred or abused its discretion by 
denying injunctive relief.181 
b. Advanced Cardiovascular Systems, Inc. v. Medtronic Vascular, Inc. 
In 2008, the District Court for the District of Delaware decided a motion 
for permanent injunction after Medtronic was found to have infringed patents 
  
permanent injunction of infringing naturally-occurring protein that stimulates the 
production of red blood cells); Acumed LLC v. Stryker Corp., No. 04-CV-513-BR, 2007 
WL 4180682, at *8 (D. Or. Nov. 20, 2007), aff’d, 551 F.3d 1323, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2008) 
(granting and affirming a permanent injunction of orthopeodic nails used to treat bone 
fractures); Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Datascope Corp., 513 F. Supp. 2d 578, 586 (D. Md. 
2007) (granting a permanent injunction of a method for fragmenting blood clots in 
hemodialysis grafts). 
 174 Voda v. Cordis Corp., No. CIV-03-1512-L, 2006 WL 2570614, at *1 (W.D. Okla. 
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belonging to Advanced Cardiovascular Systems (ACS) and relating to blood 
vessel stents.182 The court analyzed this motion under direction of the traditional 
four-factor test and concluded that a permanent injunction should be denied.183 
Under the irreparable harm factor, the court determined that ACS had failed to 
establish irreparable harm because there was “no indication that Medtronic 
[was] . . . drawing bare-metal stent sales away from ACS . . . [and] ACS [had] 
not identified any specific customers it [had] lost, or [stood] to lose, directly as a 
result of Medtronic’s continued sales of infringing stents.”184 Additionally, the 
court determined that monetary damages were adequate based on ACS’s 
previous licensing of the relevant patents.185 
Of particular note was the court’s analysis of the public interest factor. 
First, the court noted a strong public interest in maintaining diversity in the 
coronary stent market based on precedential support.186 Second, the court noted 
evidence contained in the record demonstrating physician preference for 
Medtronic stents.187 For these reasons, the court concluded that the public 
interest favored denial of a permanent injunction.188 Finally, because the other 
factors weighed so heavily against granting injunctive relief, the court decided to 
“not make extensive findings with respect to the balance of hardships.”189 
c. Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Associates, Inc. 
Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Associates, Inc. involved 
an infringement of a patent related to a prosthetic vascular graft.190 W.L. Gore, a 
medical device manufacturer, had infringed a patent belonging to Bard 
Peripheral Vascular, a direct competitor.191 After the finding of infringement, 
  
 182 Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc. v. Medtronic Vascular, Inc., 579 F. Supp. 2d 
554, 555–56 (D. Del. 2008). 
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Bard motioned for a permanent injunction, and the court analyzed the motion 
under the four-factor test, primarily focusing on the adequacy of remedies at law 
and public interest factors.192 Finding that both factors weighed heavily against 
granting a permanent injunction, the court denied the motion.193 Under the 
adequacy of remedies at law factor, the court determined that Bard could be 
made whole through legal remedies, including an award of lost profits, a ten 
percent reasonable royalty rate, and the imposition of a compulsory license on 
the continued sales of the infringing products for the patent’s remaining life.194 
Under the public interest factor, the court analyzed arguments from both parties 
and tried to predict the public health ramifications of granting a permanent 
injunction.195 The court noted: 
Given the utility of Gore’s infringing products . . . [and] the important role 
that these products play in aiding vascular surgeons who perform life 
saving medical treatments, sound public policy does not favor removing 
Gore’s items from the market. The risk is too great. Placing Gore’s 
infringing products out of reach of the surgeons who rely on them would 
only work to deny many sick patients a full range of clinically effective 
and potentially life saving treatments. The Court finds that the strength of 
this factor alone precludes it from imposing a permanent injunction.196 
Ultimately, the court denied the motion without analyzing the other factors.197 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of a 
permanent injunction holding that an “award of an ongoing royalty instead of a 
permanent injunction to compensate for future infringement is appropriate in 
some cases.”198 
d. Johnson & Johnson Vision Care, Inc. v. CIBA Vision Corp. 
After a finding of infringement of its patents related to extended-wear 
contact lenses, CIBA Vision Corp. motioned for a permanent injunction against 
the infringer, Johnson & Johnson Vision Care, Inc.199 While the court analyzed 
the motion under the traditional four-factor test and denied the motion, this case 
is notable for its detailed analysis regarding the public interest factor.200 Under 
this factor, the court noted many ways the public would be harmed upon the 
  
 192 Id. at *4–5. 
 193 Id. at *9. 
 194 Id. at *5. 
 195 Id. at *6–9. 
 196 Id. at *9 (emphasis added). 
 197 Id. 
 198 Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc., 670 F.3d 1171, 1192 
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grant of a permanent injunction.201 The court first noted the exorbitant costs that 
would be placed on patients to have their contact lenses refitted when the 
infringing lenses were no longer available on the market.202 The court speculated 
that the total cost for this refitting would be close to $500 million.203 The court 
also noted the “significant disruption, confusion and cost” that would occur 
upon a permanent injunction and the hardship that would be placed on the 
patients, including the time to be refitted, the risk to the patients’ health by 
avoiding refitting, or the possibility of patients substituting lenses over the 
internet without a valid prescription.204 Finally, the court highlighted the 
possibility of patients who may not be able to be refitted at all and would be 
forced to return to wearing glasses.205 While the consequences in this case are 
not as grave as in the Bard case, the court noted that “nevertheless, this Court, 
sitting in equity, finds [the] consequences to be sufficiently important and 
adverse to millions of . . . patients that the public interest would be disserved if 
an injunction were to be entered.”206 
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irreparable harm and balance of the hardships and the public’s interest in preventing the 
“unintended consequence of confusing—or worse yet, alarming—pediatric patients who 
have used these medications and their parents and doctors”). 
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IV. REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION OF PUBLIC INTEREST IN MEDICAL 
PATENT INFRINGEMENT CASES 
A. The Public Interest in Medicine 
The public has always had a large interest in medicine.207 This heightened 
interest in medicine exists due to its role in diagnosing and treating illnesses, 
extending the term of life, and improving the overall health of the general 
population.208 The United States patent system helps encourage innovation in 
medical technologies that improve the health of the population by granting 
exclusive rights to patent holders for limited terms.209 President Lincoln once 
commented on the patent system, expressing that “the patent system added the 
fuel of interest to the fire of genius.”210 While the patent system plays an 
important role in protecting inventors and encouraging innovation, there have 
been multiple times that the public interest in health has superseded this 
system.211 After the demise of the Federal Circuit’s “general rule” to 
automatically grant permanent injunctions in most infringement cases, courts 
have been given more flexibility to protect the public interest in health by 
denying permanent injunctions when medically-related patents are involved.212 
B. Reasons Why Permanent Injunctions Should Be Denied in Most Medically-
Related Patent Infringement Cases 
After eBay, courts were required to apply the traditional four-factor test 
when deciding to grant injunctive relief.213 The fourth factor, the public interest, 
  
 207 See Michael Beylkin, Much Ado About Nothing: The Biotech and Pharmaceutical 
Industries Have Little to Fear in the Post-eBay World, 6 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 
179, 208 (2007). 
 208 See id. at 208–09. 
 209 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2006). Currently, the term of a utility patent is twenty years 
from the date that the patent application is filed. Id. § 154(a)(2); see Beylkin, supra note 
207, at 209; see also Julie A. Burger & Justin Brunner, A Court’s Dilemma: When 
Patents Conflict with Public Health, 12 VA. J.L. & TECH. 7, 1–2 (2007). 
 210 Ronald J. Schutz & Patrick M. Arenz, Non-Practicing Entities and Permanent 
Injunctions Post-eBay, 12 SEDONA CONF. J. 203, 209 (2011). 
 211 See Burger & Brunner, supra note 209 (providing an overview of times that the 
public interest in health has superseded the patent system including the anthrax scare in 
2001 and other various actions taken by the government to curtail patent rights in these 
situations). 
 212 See supra Part II.B; see also Burger & Brunner, supra note 209, at 64–70. 
 213 eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006). 
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has sparingly been used in medically-related cases to deny injunctive relief.214 
Because the public has such a great interest in medicine, courts should apply a 
rebuttable presumption, finding that the public interest weighs in favor of 
denying injunctive relief in all cases that involve medically-related patents. If a 
plaintiff cannot produce convincing evidence to rebut this presumption, courts 
should deny injunctive relief, even when the other three factors weigh in favor 
of granting a permanent injunction. This rebuttable presumption would not 
contravene eBay because Justice Kennedy’s concurrence suggests that certain 
patents might not be suited for injunctive relief.215 Furthermore, if injunctive 
relief was denied in these cases, the plaintiff would not be left without remedy 
but would be able to obtain remedies at law via monetary awards, reasonable 
royalties, or compulsory licenses.216 Overall, this rebuttable presumption would 
protect and promote the substantial public interest in the public health.217 Courts 
should apply a rebuttable presumption that the public interest weighs in favor of 
denying injunctive relief for the following reasons. 
1. Judicial Uniformity 
The most striking reason that courts should apply a rebuttable 
presumption that the public interest weighs in favor of denying injunctive relief 
in all cases that involve medically-related patents is judicial uniformity. Of the 
cases described in Part IV, one glaring conclusion is apparent: courts apply the 
traditional four factors unpredictably in these cases, even when devices are 
relatively identical.218 Even when important devices that help sustain life are 
involved (i.e., prosthetic heart valves, vascular stents, and hemodialysis 
machines), courts unpredictably apply the factors, with some courts granting 
injunctive relief despite public interest concerns and other courts denying 
  
 214 See Johnson & Johnson Vision Care, Inc. v. CIBA Vision Corp., 712 F. Supp. 2d 
1285 (M.D. Fla. 2010); Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc., No. 
CV-03-0597-PHX-MHM, 2009 WL 920300, at *4 (D. Ariz. Mar. 31, 2009) aff’d, 670 
F.3d 1171, vacated in part on reconsideration, 682 F.3d 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2012), and 
vacated in part on reh’g en banc, 476 F. App’x 747 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Advanced 
Cardiovascular Sys., Inc. v. Medtronic Vascular, Inc., 579 F. Supp. 2d 554 (D. Del. 
2008). 
 215 eBay, 547 U.S. at 396–97 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 216 See Bernard H. Chao, After eBay Inc. v. MercExchange: The Changing Landscape 
for Patent Remedies, 9 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 543 (2008) (for a discussion of other 
remedies available to patent holders when injunctive relief is denied). 
 217 See Beylkin, supra note 207, at 209. 
 218 See supra Part IV. Compare Edwards Lifesciences AG v. CoreValve, Inc., 699 
F.3d 1305, 1315–16 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (vacating and remanding district court’s denial of 
permanent injunction of an infringed prosthetic device related to the heart) with Bard 
Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc., 670 F.3d 1171, 1192 (Fed. Cir. 
2012) (affirming district court’s denial of permanent injunction of an infringed prosthetic 
device related to the heart). 
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injunctive relief due to public interest concerns.219 This lack of judicial 
uniformity creates many problems. First, patients and health practitioners are 
unable to predict when injunctions may occur and lack adequate time to prepare 
for the transition resulting from injunctions. Also, legal practitioners are unable 
to predict outcomes based on the facts related to their individual cases. 
Furthermore, courts waste scarce judicial resources to determine injunctive relief 
in each fact-intensive case, although no factual similarities among medically-
related patent cases can explain courts’ denial or grant of injunctive relief. If a 
rebuttable presumption was applied in medically-related cases, patients and 
health practitioners would no longer be blindsided by the sudden effect of a 
permanent injunction, legal practitioners would be able to better predict judicial 
outcomes based on the facts of their cases, and courts would no longer waste 
judicial resources to determine injunctive relief for each medically-related patent 
infringement case. Even if a rebuttable presumption in these cases was 
considered to be too expansive, courts should attempt to create predictable 
outcomes of injunctive relief based on specific factual differences. For example, 
courts could establish categorical denial or grant of injunctive relief based on 
certain factual trends (i.e., type of device or drug involved or medical condition 
treated by the device or drug). 
2. Physician Preference 
Another reason that courts should apply a rebuttable presumption of 
public interest is because of physician preference for the infringing device. 
Doctors may prefer the infringing device for many reasons including superiority 
of the infringing device, greater knowledge of the infringing device, or, simply, 
greater ease of use of the infringing device.220 While courts have commonly used 
physician preference for support in denying preliminary injunctions, physician 
preference has rarely been used in support of denying permanent injunctions.221 
Physician preference is important because, if a permanent injunction is granted 
and the physician can no longer use the preferred infringing device, there are 
potential risks to the patient in continuing treatment. For example, in Advanced 
Cardiovascular, physician preference was used as support in denying a 
permanent injunction because declarations by four cardiologists each expressed 
  
 219 See supra Part IV. 
 220 See Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc. v. Medtronic Vascular, Inc., 579 F. Supp. 
2d 554, 561 (D. Del. 2008); Datascope Corp. v. Kontron, Inc., 611 F. Supp. 889, 895 (D. 
Mass. 1985), aff’d, 786 F.2d 398 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (“Defendant has also made some 
showing that the public will be harmed by an injunction in that some physicians prefer 
defendant’s dual lumen IABs.”). 
 221 See Robert A Matthews, Jr., 4 ANNOTATED PATENT DIGEST § 32:81 (2013). 
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“concern for the success of their surgeries should [the infringing] products be 
removed from the market.”222 
3. Interest in Medical Competition 
A third reason supporting a rebuttable presumption of public interest is 
the public interest in medical competition. This interest has been used by both 
district courts and the Federal Circuit to deny injunctive relief in cases involving 
coronary stents.223 Other courts have used this interest to support a denial of 
injunctive relief or limiting injunctive relief.224 The theory behind this interest is 
the need for patients to have alternative safe medical devices.225 Patients need to 
have more alternatives in the medical device market in order to make informed 
decisions about their treatment.226 When injunctions occur, patients are at risk of 
having only one viable option on the market,227 and, even worse, patients may 
have no viable alternatives after a permanent injunction due to supply issues 
with the patented product. 
4. Supply of the Patented Product 
Another reason supporting a rebuttable presumption of public interest is 
the risk of the patent holder being unable to meet patient demand once the 
infringing product is taken off the market. While some courts have noted this 
concern, it has found little use in supporting a denial of injunctive relief.228 Even 
  
 222 Advanced Cardiovascular, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 561. 
 223 See id.; see also Cordis Corp. v. Boston Scientific Corp., 99 F. App’x 928, 935 
(Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[A] strong public interest supports a broad choice of drug-eluting 
stents, even though no published study proves the superiority of either . . . stent.”); Cordis 
Corp. v. Boston Scientific Corp., Nos. Civ.A. 03-027-SLR, Civ.A. 03-283-SLR, 2003 
WL 22843072, at *2 (D. Del. Nov. 21, 2003) (noting the “obvious concern of depriving 
the public of the best and safest medical devices by limiting competition”). 
 224 See B. Braun Melsungen AG v. Terumo Med. Corp., 778 F. Supp. 2d 506, 526 (D. 
Del. 2011); Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc., No. CV-03-
0597-PHX-MHM, 2009 WL 920300, at *4–10 (D. Ariz. Mar. 31, 2009), aff’d, 670 F.3d 
1171 (Fed. Cir. 2012), vacated in part on reconsideration, 682 F.3d 1003 (Fed. Cir. 
2012), and vacated in part on reh’g en banc, 476 F. App’x 747 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 225 B. Braun, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 526. 
 226 See Conceptus, Inc. v. Hologic, Inc., No. C 09-02280 WHA, 2012 WL 44064, at 
*1–4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2012) (denying a permanent injunction of an infringing 
contraceptive because the four factors weighed in favor of a denial and, primarily, the 
public had an interest in “having a choice of products”). 
 227 See id. 
 228 Compare Pozen Inc. v. Par Pharm., Inc., 800 F. Supp. 2d 789, 799, 825 (E.D. Tex. 
2011) (noting supply concerns yet granting injunctive relief), with Cordis Corp. v. Boston 
Scientific Corp., No. Civ.A. 03-027-SLR, 2003 WL 22843072, at *2 (D. Del. Nov. 21, 
2003), aff’d, 99 F. App’x 928 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (denying preliminary injunction for 
infringed drug-eluting stents due to public health risks posed by inadequate supply). 
 
324 Chicago-Kent Journal of Intellectual Property [Vol. 13 
 
 
 
if a patent holder is able to meet customer demand this could potentially prove 
costly to patent holders who are ill-equipped to handle the rise in demand. This 
could make injunctive relief seem more like a curse than a blessing. Some courts 
have attempted to ease these supply concerns by providing transition periods 
that delay the time that the permanent injunction goes into effect.229 If courts are 
unwilling to apply a rebuttable presumption of public interest in medically-
related patent cases, courts should allow for periods of transition in all 
medically-related infringement cases to protect the public from potential supply 
issues. Finally, while unrelated to the supply of the patent holder’s product, 
there have been expressed concerns regarding the unused supply of the 
infringing product when a permanent injunction ceases its distribution.230 This 
can lead to waste that ultimately harms the general public.231 
5. Costs of Transition 
A fifth reason supporting a rebuttable presumption of public interest is the 
exorbitant costs of transition in the event of a permanent injunction. Patients 
may take on additional costs due to an increase in price for the alternative 
product or additional appointments with doctors to make the transition.232 
Additionally, patients may even be encouraged not to make the transition, thus 
placing them at increased health risks.233 Patients are not the sole cost-bearing 
entity in a transition, however. Medical professionals can also experience 
exorbitant transitional costs including training of personnel to use the alternative 
device, increasing prices for the alternative device, and disposal of existing 
inventories of the infringing product.234 
6. Other Considerations 
Underlying each preceding reason is the primary concern for patient 
safety. However, there are additional considerations that help support the 
necessity for a rebuttable presumption of public interest. These considerations 
include potential inequitable use of the patent by the patentee, potential harm 
when the patentee does not commercially practice the patent, or the harm to 
patient privacy and the physician-patient relationship in enforcing the 
injunction.235 
  
 229 See Shiley, Inc. v. Bentley Labs., Inc., 601 F. Supp. 964, 971 (C.D. Cal. 1985). 
 230 See Burger & Brunner, supra note 209, at 99–101. 
 231 See id. 
 232 See Johnson & Johnson Vision Care, Inc. v. CIBA Vision Corp., 712 F. Supp. 2d 
1285, 1291 (M.D. Fla. 2010) (speculating that the total cost of transition could reach 
$500 million). 
 233 See id. 
 234 See Burger & Brunner, supra note 209, at 99–101. 
 235 See id. at 82–89, 107–09. 
 
No. 1] Rebuttable Presumption of Public Interest in Protecting the Public Health 325 
 
 
 
 
C. Hypotheticals 
The necessity for a rebuttable presumption that the public interest weighs 
in favor of denying injunctive relief in cases involving medically-related patents 
is best demonstrated by a set of hypothetical situations. 
1. The Teenage Girl 
Consider a teenage girl who has used a specific contraceptive for many 
months. All of a sudden the contraceptive is taken off the market due to a 
permanent injunction forcing the girl to use a new contraceptive. There are three 
effects that could potentially occur from this injunction. First, the new 
contraceptive could prove less effective than her previous contraceptive. This 
could injure the girl both medically and financially. Second, the new 
contraceptive could provide the girl with a different physiological reaction than 
the previous contraceptive potentially causing significant harm to the girl’s 
health. Third, the new contraceptive could be out of stock due to the increased 
demand, leaving the girl with no viable alternatives. Ultimately, the girl is 
placed at greater risks when a permanent injunction is granted. 
2. The Senior Citizen 
Next, consider a senior citizen who has suffered many years from heart 
complications. For five years he has been using a coronary stent. This stent is 
implanted surgically and must be replaced every year. Upon the man’s yearly 
replacement, he is informed that the stent he has been using for the past five 
years is no longer available due to a permanent injunction. There are four effects 
that could potentially occur from this injunction. First, the man could choose not 
to replace the stent, thus placing his health at risk. Second, the man could use a 
new stent that proves ineffective, thus exacerbating his existing heart condition. 
Third, the man’s physician could be less comfortable surgically implanting the 
new stent, thus increasing the risk of the replacement surgery. Finally, the new 
stent could be unavailable due to the increased demand, leaving the man with no 
viable alternatives. Ultimately, the senior citizen is placed at greater risks when 
a permanent injunction is granted. 
3. The Sole Community Hospital 
Finally, imagine a small community that has one hospital. This hospital 
uses a particular type of MRI machine. One day, the hospital is informed that the 
MRI machine has been subjected to a permanent injunction, and the hospital 
must purchase an alternative to continue performing MRIs. There are many 
effects that could potentially occur due to this injunction. First, the hospital may 
not have the resources available to purchase the new machine. This would force 
all patients in need of an MRI to visit alternative hospitals. This would place the 
hospital at financial risk and the patients at both financial and physical risk. 
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Second, the hospital may purchase the new machine but improperly train its 
personnel how to use the new machine thereby leading to inaccurate test results. 
Third, the hospital may purchase the new machine but be forced to make 
significant budget cuts, which diminishes hospital resources overall. Ultimately, 
the sole community hospital and the members of the community are placed at 
greater risks when a permanent injunction is granted. 
CONCLUSION 
Injunctive relief has long been considered an “extraordinary” remedy.236 
However, this has been at odds with the frequency that district courts grant 
injunctive relief in patent infringement cases. Because the interest of the public 
is one of the factors in the traditional four-factor test, it is obvious that the public 
interest is of great concern to courts. However, the large number of permanent 
injunctions granted in medically-related patent infringement cases presents 
many risks and potential harm to the public; therefore, courts should play a role 
in helping to protect the interest in public health by applying a rebuttable 
presumption that the public interest weighs in favor of denying injunctive relief 
in cases that involve medically-related patents. 
 
  
 236 Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982). 
